Summary
This article demonstrates what happens to weak states and economies who become too dependent on Russian gas. Central and East European states who depend on Russian gas should be especially alarmed about that dependence. These points also underscore the urgency for the EU to devise a viable energy policy. While this row will not directly affect Europe for now, it shows what happens if a government falls into Moscow's trap and then cannot pay its bills. Their government falls apart and their economy becomes vulnerable to Russian takeovers that ultimately imperil their actual independence. Thus dependence on Russian gas and oil translates into enduring economic and political leverage. Minsk's shrinking control over its own domestic economy could well become the harbinger of future outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe if those states and the EU cannot devise a response to Russian pressure. And even in the West, as in Germany, Russia exercises a significant leverage over policy.
Analysis
The firing of the Belarussian officials is direclty traceable to their failure to ensure that Belarus could pay its debts inicurred inteh January 2007 agreement with Russia. Ultimately this means that Belarus will have to yield control of parts of its economy, probably its gas distribution network, to Gazprom and Moscow. This is a warning sign for hte natural gas companies of all the smaller states of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia has closed big deals with them recently and they depend upon its natural gas to survive. If their ability to live up to their contract falters, it is likely that they will have to give up equty for debt. But worse than that is the fact that we know these deals allow Moscow to pentrate their political systems, buy politicians and other industries, subvert the normal political process, and exercise signficant political leverage in these countries. The record from the Baltic to the Black Sea is littered with such examples. Finally their own domestic companies who are partners with Russia, whether they be RuhrGas, Total, E.On, ENI or less well known firms, then become spokesmen for accomodating Russian foreign policy, e.g. on missile defense and democratization issues, thereby increasing Rusisan influence on their host countries' politics and their own dependence upon Rusian gas and funds. Thus Belarus' example should serve as a warning bell to other Central and East European gas firms and to every European government.
